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Abstract This paper analyzes the effects of changes in relative bargaining
power within two-member households participating in labor and product
markets. The most striking effects occur when household members differ in
individual preferences and enjoy positive leisure-dependent externalities. For
instance, a global change in relative bargaining power where the hardworking
member becomes more influential in each working class household can render
the working class worse off. Moreover, we show that restrictions on labor
supply can prevent hard workers from exerting too much pressure on their
hedonistic partners to work more. A restriction on individual labor supply
improves welfare of the working class population, which adds a new twist to
the literature on why working hours are limited in many European countries.
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1 Introduction
We study how a shift of bargaining power in favor of one partner in a
household affects consumption and labor supply of both partners. We further
investigate how the shift of bargaining power in a particular household causes
a change of market prices and impacts upon other households. The case
where such shifts occur in many households is considered as well. The shift
of bargaining power in favor of female partners that appears to have taken
place in the last decades may be an example for the latter.
For the purpose of this investigation, we embed a simple labor supply model
in a general equilibrium model. We distinguish between two goods: labor
(leisure) and a composite consumption good. Individuals are endowed with
leisure, part of which they consume and part of which they supply to the
labor market. Labor is demanded by a production sector that produces the
composite consumption good.
Our modeling approach has several motivations and justifications. It
demonstrates how one can perform general equilibrium analysis with a model
of the household that is close to Chiappori’s and the empirical literature. It also
demonstrates that general equilibrium models with multi-member households
can be extended to economies with production.1 Further, our current analysis
shows that spillovers between households are not necessarily mitigated by the
presence of a production sector. Moreover, it discovers new feedback effects
in the presence of a production sector: A change in a household’s labor supply
alters aggregate labor supply and real wage rates which in turn affect all
households. Finally, introducing labor and a pure consumption good permits
the distinction between hard workers and hedonistic household members who
differ in their marginal rate of substitution between leisure and the composite
consumption good.
Having labor as a factor of production allows us to differentiate between
labor and capital income. For most of the analysis, we distinguish between
a working class and a leisure class. The working class members receive only
labor income and form the two-person households under consideration. The
leisure class members receive all capital income and no labor income. Their
consumer and household characteristics are not specified further. Instead of a
leisure class, we can also have a government that absorbs all profits without
affecting household decisions.
Our first central result is that hard workers are bad company. If the hard
worker in a household gains more influence, the partner is induced to work
more and consume less, whereas the hard worker tends to work less and
consume more. Moreover, through the labor market, the hard worker causes
negative spillovers to the members of other households, both hard workers
1Gersbach and Haller (2001) and Haller (2000) incorporate collective rationality à la Chiappori
(1988, 1992) into general equilibrium models of a pure exchange economy with multi-member
households. For applications to bargaining, see Gersbach and Haller (2009, 2011).
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and hedonists. The severity of these spillovers depends on the nature of
externalities within households. Perhaps the most striking result is that a
global change in relative bargaining power, where the hardworking member
becomes more influential in each working class household, can render the
entire working class worse off—with the leisure class as the sole beneficiary.
A similar effect cannot happen in a model without production or with the
production sector fully owned by the working class.
Our second important finding is that a binding restriction on the number of
hours an individual is allowed to work can benefit all workers, those for whom
the restriction is binding and those for whom it is not. This finding represents a
new argument why limits on working hours might be chosen in countries such
as the Nordic countries, The Netherlands, or Germany, where weekly hours
and paid annual leave are collectively agreed on and the former are restricted.
We will elaborate on this implication of our model and on the related literature
in Section 7.
In the next section, we introduce some of the main features of consumers,
households, and the production sector or industry. In Section 3, we present
and analyze the basic general equilibrium framework with fixed (leisure-
independent) externalities within households. In Section 4, we consider the
equilibrium effects of local (global) changes in relative bargaining power
which lead to a growing influence of the hardworking member of a house-
hold (members of households). Section 5 comprises four model variations:
introduction of a particular form of variable (leisure-dependent) externalities,
treatment of the composite consumption good as a local public good rather
than as a private good, introduction of binding exogenous restrictions on
individual labor supply, and introduction of industry ownership by working
class households. In Section 6, we address the robustness of our results. In
Section 7, we resume the discussion of restrictions on labor supply. Section 8
concludes. “Appendix 1” discusses the household bargaining environment.
“Appendix 2” contains the proof of Proposition 4.
2 Composition of society and the economy
We consider an economy composed of finitely many households h = 1, . . . , n,
with n ≥ 2. Household h has two members h1 and h2, called the first member
and the second member, respectively. The members of all n households form a
population I of size 2n. There are two goods: leisure and a private Hicksian
composite good whose price p is normalized to unity. Consumption of hi,
the i-th member of household h, consists of his composite good consumption,
denoted by chi , and his consumption of leisure, denoted by T − lhi where T
denotes the total time available to each individual and lhi denotes hi’s labor
supply. The resource constraints and the assumption of interior solutions imply
that:
chi > 0 and 0 < l
h
i < T, i = 1, 2.
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Individual preferences Utility of individual hi is given by:
Uhi := ki ln chi + (1 − ki) ln(T − lhi ) + Ghi (lhi , lhj ).
The coefficient ki ∈ (0, 1) represents the weight of the physical consumption
good relative to leisure. The term Ghi (l
h
i , l
h
j ) represents a group externality
experienced by individual hi, i.e., the emotional benefit of individual hi from
living together with individual h j, j = i. Household members can differ with
respect to the weights ki and, of course, with respect to the group externality
Ghi (l
h
i , l
h
j ).
When k1 > k2, we call the first household members “hard workers” and
the second household members “hedonists”. Often the term “hard worker”
describes simply a person with a strong work ethic or an addiction to or
obsession for work. Our notion captures more sophisticated behavior. As
an autonomous consumer facing a given real wage rate, the hard worker
would work more and consume more of the composite commodity than the
autonomous hedonist. As a household member (with a lot of weight in the
household’s utilitarian decision rule), the hard worker may actually end up
working less and consuming more than the hedonistic partner. Thus, without
knowing their respective influence on household decisions, an outside observer
might mistake the hard worker for the hedonist and vice versa.
We will consider two plausible cases of group externalities: first, when the
emotional benefit from being together with a partner is fixed and second, when
the group externality depends on the leisure time or access time of the other
household member.2
On preferences Several remarks about the nature of preferences are in order.
The most natural assumption, which will be pursued in Section 5, is variable
externalities where the individual’s benefit of human relationships is increasing
in the leisure time the partner can offer. Intuitively, the emotional benefit in
partnerships depends on the time individuals have to share. If such externali-
ties are quite strong, households will tend to synchronize their leisure time. The
synchronization of working or leisure schedules in the presence of externalities
has received widespread attention in other contexts such as interaction of
workers in production facilities studied by Weiss (1996) and liberalization of
shop-closing laws for which the theory has been developed by Clemenz (1990)
and Burda and Weil (1999); see also Putnam (1995).
There are two sources of externalities in our model. First, non-pecuniary
externalities, i.e., group externalities occur only at the household level and
are internalized by efficient collective decisions within households. As we
will discuss in detail in Section 5.4, the presence of such household-specific
group externalities does not destroy Pareto-efficiency of competitive markets.
Second, when we discuss local and global changes of bargaining power in
2Note that if the group externality depended on the leisure time of the other household member,
individual decisions about working and leisure time would not be efficient for the household.
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households, pecuniary externalities arise which do not destroy the validity of
the first welfare theorem either but can make entire classes of society worse
off.
Sources of income Except in Section 5.4, we assume that the households un-
der consideration receive only wage income. The income from holding shares
of firms is assumed to accrue to individuals who are not part of the population
I we are studying. This is justified by the fact that the majority of households
primarily depend on the wage income. We also assume that shareholders do
not participate in the labor market. There are several conceivable scenarios
for the existence of such a “leisure class”. One is that the shareholders live
on another island, continent, or planet. Another one is that at the prevailing
wages, shareholders prefer not to work. A third one is that the shareholders are
retirees who are unable to work and own shares directly or indirectly through
pension funds. Yet another alternative is that the government imposes a 100%
profit tax and spends the tax revenue on pensions or in other wasteful, harmful,
or useful ways that do not affect household decisions, an assumption often
made in the literature on optimal taxation (see, e.g., Auerbach 1985). The
government might also own the industry and thus be the recipient of all profits.
But then the assumption of profit maximization and perfect competition is less
convincing. Obviously, a convex combination of all these alternatives is quite
possible. Whoever ends up with some of the profits uses this income solely for
the purchase of the composite good.
Production sector The production sector is assumed to be perfectly competi-
tive. Since we are not concerned with the distributive aspects of share owner-
ship, it suffices to determine aggregate profits using the aggregate technology,
which is represented by a production function. The production function is of
a specific functional form with standard properties and convenient numerical
features: f (L) = β ln(1 + L) for L ≥ 0.
Decision criteria of households First of all, we adopt collective rationality à la
Chiappori (1988, 1992) regarding household behavior:
Each household makes an efficient collective decision, i.e., given prices
and wages, the household takes a decision regarding individual consump-
tion and working time of its members which is Pareto efficient within
the household. In other words, the household chooses an element in the
‘efficient budget set’ in the sense of Haller (2000) and Gersbach and
Haller (2001).
We note that important contributions to the literature argue against as-
suming efficiency in household decision making (Lundberg and Pollak 2003;
Konrad and Lommerud 1995, 2000). For instance, Lundberg et al. (1997)
provide evidence that tends to support the idea that household members do
not pool their incomes as it would be implied by efficient collective decision
making. We stress that not efficiency of collective decision making per se
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is important but that a higher influence of the hardworking member in the
household translates into higher labor supply of the other partner in the
household. This could occur in a similar way or even in a more dramatic
way when household decision making is inefficient. The efficiency assumption,
however, renders the analysis exceptionally tractable.
Second, we assume more specifically that household decisions are based on
a utilitarian social welfare function for the household. In particular, we assume
that household h maximizes
Uh := αhUh1 + (1 − αh)Uh2 (1)
where αh ∈ (0, 1) is the utilitarian power or weight of the first individual. The
weight αh and (1 − αh) measures the relative influence or bargaining power of
individual 1 and individual 2, respectively, within household h. If household
h maximizes Eq. 1 under the household budget constraint, then the solution
lies in the efficient budget set, that is, at the Pareto frontier of h’s budget set.
Conversely, each element in the household’s efficient budget set maximizes
Eq. 1 on the household’s budget set with suitably chosen Pareto weights α
and 1 − α. The premise of our investigation is that the actual weights that
underly the household decision are not arbitrary but not necessarily constant
over time either. They may depend on many factors or, broadly speaking, on
the household’s bargaining environment. We refer to “Appendix 1” for further
discussion.
3 Equilibrium with fixed externalities
In this section, we assume fixed externalities, that is, Ghi (l
h
i , l
h
j ) ≡ G¯hi > 0. G¯hi
can be interpreted as a free household public good.
3.1 Household optimization
We next examine the household’s optimization problem in detail. Note that,
for the time being, we assume that households only earn income from wages,
and hence, industry shareholders do not belong to the set of households under
consideration. Therefore, the budget constraint amounts to:
ch1 + ch2 = w
(
lh1 + lh2
)
, (2)
where w denotes the wage rate. The household maximizes Eq. 1 subject to
Eq. 2 and non-negativity constraints. Ignoring non-negativity constraints and
setting αh = α, the Lagrangian for the household’s optimization problem is
given by
L = α (k1 ln ch1 + (1 − k1) ln
(
T − lh1
) + G¯h1
)
+(1 − α) (k2 ln ch2 + (1 − k2) ln
(
T − lh2
) + G¯h2
)
−λ (ch1 + ch2 − w
(
lh1 + lh2
))
.
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Straightforward analysis of the first-order conditions yields the optimal
individual consumption and labor supply:
ch1 = 2αk1wT, (3)
ch2 = 2(1 − α)k2wT, (4)
lh1 = 2
(
1
2
− α(1 − k1)
)
T, (5)
lh2 = 2
(
1
2
− (1 − α)(1 − k2)
)
T. (6)
For simplicity, we have not explicitly imposed non-negativity constraints on
labor supply. Let us assume instead that α(1 − k1) < 1/2 and (1 − α)(1 − k2) <
1/2, so that the constraints are not binding. These assumptions will have to be
suitably modified in Section 5.
Total labor supply of a household is given by:
lh1 + lh2 = 2T (αk1 + (1 − α)k2) .
Note that total labor supply depends linearly on k1 and k2 and the utilitarian
power of each individual. A proportional increase of the weight of consump-
tion relative to leisure for both individuals will increase total labor supply by
the same proportion.
3.2 Equilibrium in the labor market with homogeneous households
For the moment, we make the additional assumption that all households are
homogeneous with respect to the preferences of their members and household
utility.
Total labor supply of the economy Ls is given by:
Ls :=
n∑
h=1
[
lh1 + lh2
] = n (lh1 + lh2
) = 2Tn(αk1 + (1 − α)k2). (7)
Profit maximization involves setting the marginal product of labor equal to
the wage rate. With f (L) = β ln(1 + L) as the production function of the
economy, this yields
w = β
1 + Ls =
β
1 + 2n(αk1 + (1 − α)k2)T . (8)
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Substituting this equilibrium value for w in Eqs. 3–6, we obtain the optimal
consumption and labor input of household members:
ch1 =
αk1β
1/(2T) + n(αk1 + (1 − α)k2) , (9)
ch2 =
(1 − α)k2β
1/(2T) + n(αk1 + (1 − α)k2) , (10)
lh1 = 2
(
1
2
− α(1 − k1)
)
T, (11)
lh2 = 2
(
1
2
− (1 − α)(1 − k2)
)
T, (12)
lh1 + lh2 = 2T(αk1 + (1 − α)k2). (13)
4 Changes in relative bargaining power
Here we study the allocative and welfare consequences of a shift of the
utilitarian welfare weights within households reflecting the increased relative
importance or power of the first household member. By a global change we
mean that the utilitarian welfare weight changes in all households. A local
change describes the change of the utilitarian weight in one household.
4.1 Global changes
We first discuss how identical changes of α across all households affect
individuals and households. It follows immediately from Eqs. 9–12 that as α
increases, the first household member consumes more and works less while
the second household member consumes less and works more. Hence, first
household members are clear gainers and second household members are clear
losers from such a global change in relative bargaining power.
4.2 Local changes
In the following, we examine how shifts of bargaining power in some house-
holds affect the utility of individuals in other households where bargaining
power remains unchanged. Let us assume that in s of the households, denoted
h∗, the first individual has a weight factor α = α∗ and in n − s of the households,
denoted h∗, the individual has a weight factor α = α∗, where α∗ > α∗. This is
a departure from the homogeneity assumption made in Section 3.2. Without
loss of generality, we also assume that k1 > k2 and thus that the first household
member is more willing to sacrifice leisure time for income and consumption
of commodities. We therefore call the first member the hard worker and the
second member the hedonist.
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For the total labor input, we obtain
L =
s∑
h=1
lh
∗
1 + lh
∗
2 +
n∑
h=s+1
lh∗1 + lh∗2
= 2T(s(α∗k1 + (1 − α∗)k2) + (n − s)(α∗k1 + (1 − α∗)k2)
)
= 2T(s(α∗ − α∗)(k1 − k2) + n(α∗k1 + (1 − α∗)k2)
)
and therefore
w = β
1 + 2T(s(α∗ − α∗)(k1 − k2) + n(α∗k1 + (1 − α∗)k2)
) .
Hence:
• For h = h∗, we get
ch1 =
α∗k1β
1/(2T) + (s(α∗ − α∗)(k1 − k2) + n(α∗k1 + (1 − α∗)k2) ,
ch2 =
(1 − α∗)k2β
1/(2T) + (s(α∗ − α∗)(k1 − k2) + n(α∗k1 + (1 − α∗)k2) ,
lh1 = 2
(
1
2
− α∗(1 − k1)
)
T,
lh2 = 2
(
1
2
− (1 − α∗)(1 − k2)
)
T.
• For h = h∗, we get
ch1 =
α∗k1β
1/(2T) + (s(α∗ − α∗)(k1 − k2) + n(α∗k1 + (1 − α∗)k2) ,
ch2 =
(1 − α∗)k2β
1/(2T) + (s(α∗ − α∗)(k1 − k2) + n(α∗k1 + (1 − α∗)k2) ,
lh1 = 2
(
1
2
− α∗(1 − k1)
)
T,
lh2 = 2
(
1
2
− (1 − α∗)(1 − k2)
)
T.
This gives rise to unambiguous comparative statics for part of which we shall
temporarily treat s as a continuous variable:
Proposition 1 Suppose α∗ > α∗ and k1 > k2. Then
∂w
∂s
< 0 and
∂Uh
∗
1
∂s
< 0,
∂Uh
∗
2
∂s
< 0,
∂Uh∗1
∂s
< 0,
∂Uh∗2
∂s
< 0
where h∗ and h∗ are households whose internal balance of power remains
unchanged.
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Proof
∂w
∂s
= − 2T β(α
∗ − α∗)(k1 − k2)
[
1 + 2T(s(α∗ − α∗)(k1 − k2) + n(α∗k1 + (1 − α∗)k2)
)]2 < 0,
∂Uh
∗
1
∂s
= − k1(α
∗ − α∗)(k1 − k2)
1/(2T) + (s(α∗ − α∗)(k1 − k2) + n(α∗k1 + (1 − α∗)k2) < 0,
etc. unionsq
The proposition implies that the increase of relative importance or power
of a hard worker in one household negatively affects all other individuals
in the working population. Hard workers and hedonists in other households
equally dislike an increase of the bargaining power of the hard worker in the
particular household under consideration. An intuitive explanation would be
that the shift of bargaining power decreases (increases) the labor supply of the
hard worker (hedonist) in that household, but the net effect is positive. The
latter conclusion follows from the fact that the household’s total labor supply is
proportional to αk1 + (1 − α)k2 which increases when α rises. In turn, a higher
labor supply lowers wages and, consequently, the utility in all other households
in population I.
While the net labor supply effect in a particular household is correctly
predicted by the preceding intuitive argument, the details are quite different
from what intuition suggests. Namely, the situation turns out to be worse
for the hedonist in that household, who suffers from both a lower wage rate
and a loss of bargaining power. The hedonist works more and consumes
less than before, while the hard worker actually works less and consumes
more, as an explicit comparison shows. Furthermore, since the wage rate has
declined, industry profits are higher in the new equilibrium, and therefore,
the shareholders (the leisure class) or the government gain from the shift of
bargaining power.
To refine intuition, let us compare labor supply terms Eqs. 5 and 6 and see
who actually works more in a household, the hard worker or the hedonist. The
hard worker works more than the hedonist when both households members
are equally important or powerful, that is, when α = 1/2. However, an increase
of α leads to a reduction of the hard worker’s labor supply, which is more than
compensated by an increase of the hedonist’s labor supply. At α = (1 − k2)/
(2 − k1 − k2), both supply the same amount of labor.
The main findings of this section can be summarized as
Proposition 2 Suppose f ixed externalities. Then:
(a) A global shift of power within households towards the hardworking
members benef its those members and harms their hedonistic partners.
(b) A local shift of power within a particular household towards the hardwork-
ing member is benef icial to this individual and harms all other consumers
in I.
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We have seen that an increased weight of hard workers in household
decisions proves detrimental to the welfare of others. In fact, the presence
of hard workers per se is harmful to others. If instead of becoming more
influential, the first household member becomes more of a hard worker, the
comparative statics results with respect to other individuals are qualitatively
the same. Ceteris paribus, the person who becomes more of a hard worker,
works more and consumes more of the composite good. The only effect on
others is through a reduced wage rate and, consequently, reduced composite
good consumption. Needless to say that for the person whose preferences have
changed, a comparison of ex ante and ex post welfare is meaningless, unless
consumption of the composite good and consumption of leisure move in the
same direction. To the extent that the latter condition holds, more pronounced
workaholism, or a larger number of hard workers, can be detrimental to the
entire workforce. In Section 7, we relate this observation to the phenomenon
of prolonged work weeks in some expanding service industries.
5 Ramifications
In this section, we gain additional insights from considering four different
variations of the basic model studied thus far. First, we introduce a particular
form of variable externalities. Second, we consider the implications if all
or part of the purchased private good is converted into a public good for
the household. Third, we investigate the implications of binding exogenous
restrictions on individual labor supply. Fourth, we address the case in which
the households under scrutiny own the industry.
5.1 Variable externalities
In this section, we assume variable externalities of the form Ghi (l
h
i , l
h
j ) =
ghi ln(T − lhj ) with ghi > 0 for each household h and i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i = j. Such
variable group externalities take into account that the benefits of human
partnerships can depend on the partner as well as on the leisure time that the
partner can offer.3
3In the current formulation, leisure of either household member constitutes a local public good.
A further possibility could be that the externalities depend on the time household members can
spend together, that is, on the minimum of the individual leisure times. The qualitative behavior
of this type of externality is quite similar to the variable externalities studied next but more
cumbersome to analyze.
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After renormalizing coefficients so that they add up to unity, the utility of
household members 1 and 2, respectively, can be rewritten as
Uˆh1 = kˆ1 ln ch1 +
(
1 − kˆ1 − gˆh1
)
ln
(
T − lh1
) + gˆh1 ln
(
T − lh2
)
,
Uˆh2 = kˆ2 ln ch2 +
(
1 − kˆ2 − gˆh2
)
ln
(
T − lh2
) + gˆh2 ln
(
T − lh1
)
.
The utility of household h is given by
Uh = αˆUˆh1 + (1 − αˆ)Uˆh2 (14)
where kˆi = ki/(1 + ghi ), gˆhi = ghi /(1 + ghi ) and αˆ = α(1 + gh1)/[α(1 + gh1) + (1 −
α)(1 + gh2)].
For homogeneous households, an analysis similar to the derivations in
Sections 3.1 and 3.2 yields:
w = β
1 + 2n
(
αˆkˆ1 +
(
1 − αˆ) kˆ2
)
T
and
ch1 = 2αˆkˆ1wT =
αˆkˆ1β
1/(2T) + n
(
αˆkˆ1 +
(
1 − αˆ) kˆ2
) , (15)
ch2 = 2(1 − αˆ)kˆ2wT =
(
1 − αˆ) kˆ2β
1/(2T) + n
(
αˆkˆ1 +
(
1 − αˆ) kˆ2
) , (16)
lh1 = 2
(
1
2
− gˆh2
(
1 − αˆ) − αˆ
(
1 − kˆ1 − gˆh1
))
T
= 2
(
1
2
− gˆh2 − αˆ
(
1 − kˆ1 − gˆh1 − gˆh2
))
T, (17)
lh2 = 2
(
1
2
− gˆh1 αˆ −
(
1 − αˆ)
(
1 − kˆ2 − gˆh2
))
T
= 2
(
1
2
−
(
1 − kˆ2 − gˆh2
)
+ αˆ
(
1 − kˆ2 − gˆh1 − gˆh2
))
T. (18)
With regard to comparative statics, we observe that αˆ is increasing in α, so
that it suffices to study the response to an increase in αˆ rather than α. We
are going to elaborate on two of four conceivable cases. The other two can be
analyzed in a similar way.
Case 1 If kˆ1 > kˆ2 and kˆ1 + gˆh1 + gˆh2 < 1, then the situation is parallel to that of
Section 3. A global increase of α benefits first household members and harms
second household members. As for the effect of a local change in relative
bargaining power, if α increases only in household h, then the first member
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of household h is the only beneficiary and all other members of population I
are negatively affected.
Case 2 If kˆ1 > kˆ2 and kˆ1 + gˆh1 + gˆh2 > 1, then a global increase of α has the
opposite effects on first household members: Their equilibrium consumption
of the composite good goes up while their labor supply also goes up. We
claim that the net effect on their welfare can be negative. To verify this claim,
let us consider the equilibrium utilities, for convenience suppressing the ∧’s
momentarily. We get
Uh1 = k1 ln
(
αk1β
n(αk1 + (1 − α)k2) + 12T
)
+ (1 − k1 − gh1
)
ln
(
2T
(
gh2(1 − α) + α
(
1 − k1 − gh1
)))
+gh1 ln
(
2T
(
gh1α + (1 − α)
(
1 − k2 − gh2
)))
Differentiating Uh1 with respect to α yields:
Proposition 3 The equilibrium utility of f irst household members satisf ies
∂Uh1
∂α
= g
h
1
(−1 + gh1 + gh2 + k2
)
(1 − α) (1 − gh1 − gh2 − k2
) + gh1
+
(
1 − gh1 − k1
) (
1 − gh1 − gh2 − k1
)
α
(
1 − gh1 − gh2 − k1
) + gh2
+k1
α
− nk1(k1 − k2)
n
(
α k1 + (1 − α)k2
) + 12T
.
Proposition 3, which merely describes ∂ U
h
1
∂ α
, indicates that general equilib-
rium feedbacks interact in a complex way with the local gain in utility when a
member of a household can increase its utility by raising its utilitarian power.
Our main findings can be summarized as:
Proposition 4 Suppose variable externalities. Then assertions (a) and (b) of
Proposition 2 continue to hold for certain model parameter values. But there
exist also model parameter values such that a global or local shift of power
within households towards the hardworking member(s) is harmful to all con-
sumers in I.
The proof of Proposition 4 can be found in “Appendix 2”. A comparison
of Propositions 2 and 4 shows that the comparative statics results are sensitive
to the nature of externalities. The striking result of Proposition 4 that all con-
sumers in I can be worse off with higher α means that equilibrium outcomes
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for different α can be Pareto-ranked as far as population I is concerned. This
fact is not surprising, since profits are not distributed to these consumers, and
therefore, the model of the economy is not closed. Walras Law is violated, and
the first welfare theorem cannot be established if welfare analysis is restricted
to population I. But the welfare theorem holds, once shareholders and the
government are included. In particular, shareholders or the government gain
when all consumers in I lose.
5.2 Consumption as a local public good
In Section 5.1, we have treated leisure of either household member as a
local public good. Here we explore the implications when the composite
consumption good becomes a local public good rather than a private good.
Then the household chooses household consumption ch and labor supplies
lhi , i = 1, 2. ch replaces chi in Uhi and ch1 + ch2 in the budget equation (Eq. 2).
Moreover, Ghi ≡ 0.
Given the wage rate w, the optimal choice of household h is lh1 given by
Eq. 5, lh2 given by Eq. 6, and c
h = ch1 + ch2 with ch1 and ch2 given by Eqs. 3 and 4,
respectively. Therefore, with homogeneity across households, the equilibrium
values are given by labor supplies according to Eqs. 11 and 12 and consumption
ch as the sum of Eqs. 9 and 10,
ch = β · αk1 + (1 − α)k2
1/(2T) + n(αk1 + (1 − α)k2) .
In case k1 > k2, a global increase of α affects first members in the same
way as before: They work less and consume more after the global change of
bargaining power in households. In contrast, second members now consume
more and work more after the change of bargaining power. The equilibrium
utility of a second member is
Uh2 = k2 · ln
(
β · αk1 + (1 − α)k2
1/(2T) + n(αk1 + (1 − α)k2)
)
+(1 − k2) · ln (2T · (1 − α)(1 − k2)) and
∂Uh2 /∂α = k2 ·
k1 − k2
αk1 + (1 − α)k2
−k2 · n(k1 − k2)1/(2T) + n(αk1 + (1 − α)k2) − (1 − k2)/(1 − α).
Since (1 − k2)/(1 − α) > 1 − k2 > k1 − k2 > k2 · k1−k2αk1+(1−α)k2 , we obtain ∂Uh2 /
∂α < 0. Hence, second members are worse off after the global shift of bar-
gaining power. The extra consumption does not fully compensate for more
work.
Let us consider a local shift instead, where in each household either α = α∗
or α = α∗ > α∗. If in one of the households, say h, α increases from α∗ to α∗,
then the first member of household h is better off while everybody else is worse
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off. Namely first of all, the analog of Proposition 1 can be shown in essentially
the same way. Obviously, the first member of household h is better off. As for
the second member, the equilibrium utility Uh2 can be decomposed into three
logarithmic terms. When we signed ∂Uh2 /∂α before, we found that the negative
effect of an increase of α on the third term exceeds the positive effect on the
first term while the effect on the second term is negative. This finding also
applies to a local change from α∗ to α∗.
We conclude that the assertion of Proposition 2 also holds when the
composite consumption good is a local public good in every household. The
conclusion still holds if the consumption good is a local public good in some
households and a private good in the rest of the households. The conclusion
further persists for certain model specifications where the household converts
some but not all of the purchased consumption good into a local public good.
5.3 Restrictions on labor supply
Restrictions on working hours are well-known labor market regulations in
many countries, either collectively agreed (e.g., the Nordic countries, The
Netherlands, or Germany), or statutory-regulated (e.g., France).4 We next
examine whether more leisure is beneficial for the working class in our model.
We have seen that more importance or power of hard workers induces hard
workers to work less and hedonists to work more, with the overall effect
of an increased aggregate labor supply and a lower wage rate. We are now
looking at restrictions on individual labor supply that prevent the amount of
labor supplied by hedonists to go up. Then more importance or power of hard
workers leads to a decrease of aggregate labor supply. We find
Proposition 5 A binding (quantitative) restriction on individual labor supply
can be benef icial to all members of population I (if α rises).
For a comparison between a model with and without binding restrictions
on individual labor supply, we start with an equilibrium of the basic model of
Sections 3 and 4, with k1 > k2, α = α′, and lh1 < lh2 where according to Eq. 12,
lh2 = (1 − 2(1 − α′)(1 − k2))T. (19)
4The employment effects of such work week restrictions, if any, have been modest and ambiguous.
The empirical evidence tends to reject the idea that reducing work hours will help to decrease
unemployment (see Börsch-Supan 2002; Entorf et al. 1992; Hunt 1998). Possibly, the hourly
productivity and hourly wage of those employed went up. Since many of the indirect labor costs,
like mandatory employer health insurance contributions, are independent of hours worked and
wages paid, the full cost of employment per hour increased significantly. As a consequence,
substitution of capital for labor and relocation of production to low cost countries became even
more attractive than before. Unemployment remained constant at best. At worst people got
laid off.
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We are interested in the equilibrium allocation and welfare at α > α′
when the labor supply of second household members is restricted by its α′-
equilibrium level, that is,
lh2 ≤ (1 − 2(1 − α′)(1 − k2))T. (20)
Without this restriction, there would be pressure on second household mem-
bers to supply more labor as α increases, as exhibited by Eq. 12. With the
restriction, their labor supply is frozen at the α′-equilibrium level given by
Eq. 19. Let
a = α + (1 − α)k2 = k2 + α(1 − k2) = 1 − (1 − α)(1 − k2);
a′ = α′ + (1 − α′)k2 = k2 + α′(1 − k2) = 1 − (1 − α′)(1 − k2).
The first-order conditions for the household’s optimal decision and Eq. 19
yield
λch1 = αk1/a;
λch2 = (1 − α)k2/a;
λwlh1 = λwT − α(1 − k1)/a;
λwlh2 = λwT − λ2w(1 − α′)(1 − k2)T;
and
w = (αk1 + (1 − α)k2)w−α(1 − k1) + 2λawT(1 − (1 − α′)(1 − k2)) .
It follows λ = (2a′wT)−1 and
ch1 = 2(a′/a)αk1wT; (21)
ch2 = 2(a′/a)(1 − α)k2wT; (22)
lh1 = T − 2(a′/a)α(1 − k1)T; (23)
lh2 = T − 2(1 − α′)(1 − k2)T; (24)
w = β
1 + 2n(1 − (a′/a)α(1 − k1) − (1 − α′)(1 − k2))T . (25)
Substituting Eq. 25 in Eqs. 21 and 22 yields
ch1 =
βαk1
a/(2a′T) + n(k2 + α(k1 − k2)) ; (26)
ch2 =
β(1 − α)k2
a/(2a′T) + n(k2 + α(k1 − k2)) . (27)
Let us first compare the situation α > α′ with that of α = α′ under the restric-
tion of Eq. 20. The second members’ labor supply remains constant, whereas
the first members’ labor supply decreases as α increases. Hence, aggregate
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labor supply is reduced and the wage rate goes up. Moreover, first household
members consume more and second household members consume less. Hence,
with the restriction on labor supply in place, first household members are once
again clear gainers and second household members remain clear losers from
a global change in relative bargaining power that puts more weight on first
household members.
Let us compare next the situation at α > α′ with and without the restriction.
Without the restriction, aggregate labor supply is higher at α > α′ than at α =
α′, whereas with the restriction it is less. In either case, the first household
member supplies less labor as α increases, but this negative response is weaker
with the restriction. At α > α′, all household members consume less of the
composite good with the restriction than without it, as if in the first case the
total time available to each household member were scaled down by the factor
a′/a. Let Uhi denote the difference of the equilibrium utility without and with
the restriction. Clearly, Uh1 = Uh2 = 0 at α = α′. Further
Uh1 = k1 ln[1/(2T) + n(k2 + α(k1 − k2))]
−k1 ln[a/(2a′T) + n(k2 + α(k1 − k2))]
+(1 − k1) ln a′ − (1 − k1) ln a,
Uh2 = k2 ln[1/(2T) + n(k2 + α(k1 − k2))]
−k2 ln[a/(2a′T) + n(k2 + α(k1 − k2))]
+(1 − k2) ln(1 − α) − (1 − k2) ln(1 − α′),
which implies ∂Uh1 /∂α < 0 and ∂U
h
2 /∂α < 0. This shows that all household
members benefit from the restriction if α rises. On the other hand, sharehold-
ers and the government suffer from it. The assertion of the proposition has
been demonstrated.
5.4 Distribution of profits to households
So far we have assumed that industry profits accrue to an unspecified leisure
class or are siphoned off and used by the government in a non-distortionary
fashion. Now we are considering the opposite case where the households of
population I own the entire industry. For simplicity, we might assume that
the shares of the entire industry are held by a single investment fund and
that each household h owns a proportion θh ≥ 0 of that fund, with ∑h θh = 1.
Then, if the industry profit is π , household h receives capital or dividend
income θhπ in addition to labor income. More generally, we might assume that
there exist finitely many firms labeled j = 1, . . . , m with respective profits π j.
Household h owns a proportion θhj ≥ 0 of firm j and receives capital income
(dividend payment, profit share) θhj π j from the firm. The household’s total
capital income is
∑
j θ
h
j π j. For each firm j,
∑
h θ
h
j = 1.
In any case, when the households own the industry and receive capital
income in addition to labor income, the analysis becomes more tedious, and
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it may prove impossible to determine the equilibrium values explicitly. On the
other hand, we are now dealing with a closed model of the economy, and the
first welfare theorem applies even with positive externalities and efficient col-
lective household decisions. This has been shown for pure exchange economies
in Haller (2000). The argument readily generalizes to economies with private
ownership of production. Hence, in stark contrast to Proposition 4, we find:
Proposition 6 Suppose that the households in population I own the entire
industry. If a global change in relative bargaining power benef its (harms) one
group of household members, say f irst members, then it harms (benef its) the
other group. If a local change in relative bargaining power benef its (harms) a
group of individuals, then it harms (benef its) some member of the rest of the
population.
The preceding proposition is reminiscent of the differential impact of pecu-
niary and non-pecuniary externalities in a general equilibrium model. While
the former do not destroy Pareto-efficiency, the latter do in general unless
they are internalized. In our model, non-pecuniary externalities occur only at
the household level and are internalized by efficient collective decisions within
households. Thus, the first welfare theorem still applies.
6 Robustness
Our analysis relies on a variety of simplifying assumptions which help to
obtain a tractable solution. We address in the current section the robustness
of our results with regard to several of these assumptions. The main results we
focus on are: First, hard workers are bad company. Second, a global change
in relative bargaining power where the hardworking member becomes more
influential in each working class household can render the entire working class
worse off. Third, a binding restriction on the number of hours an individual is
allowed to work can benefit all workers.
6.1 Production and preferences
We have assumed a simple production function to determine the wage rate
endogenously. Important for our results is that the marginal productivity of
labor is sufficiently decreasing in the relevant region. Production functions
of the type f (L) = β · Lτ with 0 < τ ≤ τ¯ for some τ¯ < 1 would yield the
same results. More sophisticated methods of wage determination, for instance
collective bargaining, may but need not undo our findings. As long as the wage
rate is responsive to aggregate labor supply in a similar way, the same results
obtain. Regarding preferences, what is important is the substitutability of
consumption and labor. Assuming CES utility functions with a sufficiently high
elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure would reinforce our
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results. CES utility functions, however, prove much less tractable when we
consider changes of relative bargaining power.
The model allows for some albeit moderate degree of household and
consumer heterogeneity. A slight variation of consumer characteristics across
households, for instance replacing T by Thi ≈ T, has only a minor effect on
aggregate labor supply Ls = ∑nh=1[lh1 + lh2 ] and the wage rate given by w =
1/(1 + Ls). Furthermore, a small fraction of households can be quite different
from the typical ones, for example consist of single person households. Still,
some of our analysis rests on a close to homogeneous household structure,
which can be viewed as the outcome of assortative matching.
6.2 Richer household models
The literature has identified important features of household formation and
household decisions such as existence of household production (Apps and
Rees 2001), non-participation in the labor market (Donni 2003), presence of
children (Browning et al. 2004), unearned income (Chiappori 1988), and other
types of caring preferences (Chiappori 1992; Vermeulen et al. 2006). Analyzing
all those features in our model is a large research program of its own. Here we
confine ourselves to four observations.
Children The traditional way of considering children in household decisions
is to treat them as local public goods. Assuming that children do not earn
labor income, children can be incorporated as local public goods as indicated
in Section 5.2. If parents devote part of their leisure time to child care, then
a combination of the analysis in Sections 5.1 and 5.2 is promising. A nascent
literature, most notably Lundberg et al. (2009), has assumed and investigated
decision power of children. If we assume that children are consumers with
bargaining power yet without labor income and that bargaining power shifts
between parents, then our qualitative findings persist.
Household production Certain types of household production, like the pro-
duction of local public goods using leisure as in Section 5.1 or using the
consumption good (or income) in Section 5.2 or variations thereof, are
readily accommodated. Arbitrary types of household production appear less
amenable to analysis.
Non-participation in the labor market In our model, at least one household
member works. In principle, it is possible that only one household member
works. So far, we have ruled out this possibility by suitable restrictions on
model parameters. When one household member does not work, the effects of
a shift of relative bargaining power within the household are subtle. Suppose
k1 > k2 and initially (1 − α)(1 − k2) > 1/2 so that the second household mem-
ber does not work. If the hard worker gains more influence, the voluntarily
unemployed spouse may still not participate in the labor market. However, if
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the hard worker’s influence increases even more, the spouse’s participation in
the labor market may be induced.
Non-labor income If non-labor income is substantial, some effects can be
weakened, neutralized or even reversed as we observe in Section 5.4: When
households receive capital income, the negative effect of a lower wage rate on
labor income is accompanied by a positive effect on profits and capital income.
6.3 Wage differentials
Wage rates tend to differ systematically between spouses. One possibility to
account for such wage differentials is to stipulate that the second household
member (hedonist) supplies lh2γ efficiency units of labor, with 0 < γ < 1, when
he/she allocates lh2 units of time to paid work. The parameter γ reflects the
skill difference between household members as the first member is assumed
to supply lh1 efficiency units of labor if he/she allocates l
h
1 units of time to
work. Hourly wages differ accordingly. The consequences for our findings are
as follows: Still hard workers are bad company if they gain more influence.
However, the impact of higher bargaining power of hard workers is weakened
as the consumption gains from higher labor supply of hedonists are smaller.
The opposite conclusion holds if the first member (hard worker) has lower
skills and faces lower hourly wages: If the hard worker gains more influence,
the hedonist suffers more as he/she has to increase his/her labor supply more
than with identical skills.
7 Discussion of restrictions on labor supply
In this section, we discuss our findings regarding limits of working hours. This
literature includes several theories why working hours are limited. Among
these theories is the standard argument that restrictions on working hours
increase the relative scarcity of labor represented by a union. Alternative the-
ories why working time is restricted stress firm-workers’ externalities caused
by agency problems, which has been developed by Lazear (1981), or by the
specificity of human capital (Mincer 1974 or Becker 1971). Landers et al.
(1996) develop an interesting theory of limits on working hours, as they may
correct externalities between workers arising from promotion tournaments.
Finally, Kessing and Konrad (2006) show that restrictions on working hours
arise from the incentives of unions to impact on the redistribution outcome in
a welfare state.
We add a new twist to this literature. Restrictions on labor supply can
prevent hard workers from exerting too much pressure on their hedonistic
partners to work more. A restriction on individual labor supply improves
welfare of the working class population.
Why restrictions on working hours have not been observed in the USA
might be explained by two differences between labor markets in the USA
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and Europe (see, e.g., Freeman 1993). First, labor has much less power to
force regulation in the USA compared to continental Europe, and second,
profit income is more widely dispersed in the USA than in continental Europe,
and hence, the separation between a working and a leisure class is less
pronounced in the USA which, in turn, may make welfare effects of labor
supply constraint more ambiguous. Indeed, our model predicts that if profit
income is widely dispersed among workers, hard workers will not support
restrictions of working hours.
However, the story is not complete by looking only at working hours. In
Germany and France, collective or governmental wage setting has contributed
to the emergence and persistence of unemployment. Although we have not
formally examined unemployment and real wage rigidity, the model can be
extended in a straightforward way to such settings. While unemployed persons
are harmed by restricting working hours and above market clearing wages
in our extended model, employed individuals may benefit twice from such
joint interventions in the labor market, in particular if they are hedonists.
The joint determination of working hours and real wages creates two insider
and outsider subclasses among the working class, depending on whether an
individual is employed and whether an individual is a hedonist or a hard
worker. The insider subclass consisting of hedonists benefits most by creating
negative externalities for the unemployed and the leisure class. A formal
analysis of the implications of unemployment is left to future research.
8 Conclusions
We interpreted a change of household preferences in the form of a shift of the
utilitarian weights in the household objective function as a change in relative
bargaining power. We found that such a change causes spillovers on other
households. The size and sign of these spillovers depend on whether changes in
relative bargaining power are local or global, intra-household externalities are
fixed or variable, individual labor supply restrictions are binding or not, and
whether working households own the production sector or not. The spillovers
occur through the labor market. As a rule, they occur only when the two
household members differ in their individual preferences, so that they can be
labeled as “hard worker” and “hedonistic”. Otherwise, the change in relative
bargaining power within a household does not affect the aggregate labor
supply of the household (as inspection of Eqs. 13 and 17 plus Eq. 18 shows)
and the labor market is shut down as channel for spillovers.
The framework may also be extended by considering richer family struc-
tures. In particular, incorporating children and home production is a fruitful
line for future research. For instance, the presence of children likely tends to
increase the amount and diversity of externalities generated in a household
while leisure time will become more scarce. As a consequence, it might be
even more advantageous for the working class to restrict work hours.
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Appendix 1: The bargaining environment
As a rule, there is a surplus to be divided by household members, for
instance a surplus relative to the outside opportunities they would have as
single individuals. The creation of such a surplus constitutes the rationale
for household formation in the first place. The disappearance of any surplus
can cause dissolution of the household. If in our context individuals have the
same preferences for private consumption and leisure as household members,
represented by
U0i := ki ln chi + (1 − ki) ln
(
T − lhi
)
,
then the term Gh1 + Gh2 constitutes a potential surplus resulting from forma-
tion of household h. But how will any potential surplus be divided among
household members? Browning et al. (2006, p. 6) list a number of different
approaches to model intra-household bargaining. They further state—and we
concur—that there is no broad consensus which particular model to use. We
follow them and many others and assume collective rationality of households.
As mentioned in Section 2, serious objections have been raised against this
assumption. But both the theoretical and the empirical literature appear to be
split in this matter: Browning and Chiappori (1998, p. 1245) claim “support for
our view that the collective model is a viable alternative to the unitary model.”
Given that one assumes collective rationality, a particular efficient house-
hold decision in our context can always be obtained as the outcome of max-
imizing a utilitarian welfare function (Eq. 1) subject to the budget constraint
(Eq. 2) and non-negativity constraints. While the weights α and 1 − α are taken
as exogenous by the household, they are not necessarily exogenous or constant
over time. The literature (e.g., Browning et al. 2004, 2006; Chiappori and
Ekeland 2006) tends to distinguish between so-called distribution factors and
prices as variables that influence intra-household balance of bargaining power.
We follow Basu (2006) and distinguish between endogenous, denoted x, and
exogenous, denoted z, determinants of intra-household bargaining power. The
labor incomes wlh1 and wl
h
2 would constitute endogenous factors and might be
part of x. Exogenous factors could be non-labor income(s), legal provisions,
the sex ratio in the marriage market, individual wealth at the time of household
formation, etc. In the context of Basu (2006), x = x(α) and α = α̂(x, z). Basu
considers two conceivable scenarios: First, given z, the values of α and x are
endogenously and simultaneously determined, where α is a fixed point of the
composed mapping α → α̂(x(α), z) and x = x(α). Second, still x = x(α), but α
adjusts to endogenous factors with a time lag: xt, zt, and αt follow a dynamic
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process in discrete time t where xt = x(αt), αt = α̂(xt−1, zt). The latter scenario
is the more plausible one.
Several qualifications are warranted in our context: (a) Some variables
which are exogenous for the household, like the wage rate, are endogenously
determined in the economy. (b) When we take a snapshot of the economy from
time to time, some or all of the α’s in various households may have changed,
since the exogenous factors zt (and possibly the endogenous factors xt as well
once homogeneity is lost) may affect bargaining power in different households
differently over time. (c) The economy may experience other changes over
time, for instance technological progress. In our context, the latter could be
implemented by considering variations in the coefficient β of the production
function. Technological progress simply means an increase in β. In general,
such an increase, ceteris paribus, need not benefit all consumers, but it does
in our model. If an individual benefits from a change of bargaining power,
then the effect is enhanced by technological progress. In contrast, if an indi-
vidual would suffer from a change of bargaining power without technological
progress, then this effect and the impact of technological progress on the
individual’s welfare mitigate or offset each other.
On income pooling Prima facie, maximization of Eq. 1 subject to the house-
hold budget constraint (Eq. 2) suggests a unitary model of the household
and income pooling. However, the distinction between presence and absence
of income pooling cannot simply be reduced to a distinction between “one-
pot” and “two-pot” households, the presence or absence of a common budget
constraint. Income pooling stricto sensu means a common budget constraint
plus constancy of the function α̂. While we have not modeled any function α̂
explicitly, its implicit assumption explains a possible shift of intra-household
bargaining power over time and the conceivable absence of income pooling
despite Eqs. 1 and 2.
Widespread shifts of intra-household bargaining power Here we mention
just a few examples of how distribution factors and consequently relative
bargaining power in households might change. Changes in divorce law can
change the outside options of many household members. Duration and ma-
turity of the partnership may erode (or accentuate) differences in bargaining
power (and income pooling). Namely, the buildup of sizeable durable public
goods, in particular housing, could erode differences in bargaining power and
enhance income pooling—as may the buildup of mutual trust. On the other
hand, differences in lifetime income may widen over time and cause more
asymmetry in bargaining power. Hence, with an aging population, there might
be widespread shifts of bargaining power. Such shifts might be mitigated or
reinforced by legal changes, like changes in the spousal or survivor benefits
of retirement systems. Not only past and current earnings but also future
earning prospects can influence a person’s intra-household bargaining power.
For instance, less job security in traditional manufacturing may affect relative
bargaining power in the respective households. Finally, in many cases, it may
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be difficult to separate cause and effect if there is a feedback loop of the form
x = x(α), α = α̂(x, z), which constitutes a challenge for theoretical and even
more so for empirical investigations.
Appendix 2: Proof of Proposition 4
We shall explore the relationship in Proposition 3 for special parameter
values which imply ∂ U
h
1
∂ α
< 0. In particular, suppose that k2 is very small, T is
sufficiently large, and gh1 = gh2 =: g for all h. Then we obtain approximately:
∂Uh1
∂α
≈ g(−1 + 2g)
(1 − α)(1 − 2g) + g
+ (1 − g − k1)(1 − 2g − k1)
α(1 − 2g − k1) + g ,
where we have used that
k1
α
− n k1(k1 − k2)
n
(
α k1 + (1 − α) k2
) + 12T
≈ 0.
If, in addition, g + k1 is sufficiently close to one, the second term can be
neglected. If, moreover, g < 1/2, the first term is negative and therefore
∂Uh1 /∂α < 0. Therefore, an increase in relative importance or power harms
the first household member. This validates our claim.
Let us first discuss the assumptions made during the proof of the claim
and then try to assess the result. We now return to the ∧-notation with re-
normalized utility coefficients. Then, gˆh1 = gˆh2 = gˆ corresponds to gh1 = gh2 =: g,
with gˆ = g/(1 + g). The condition gˆ < 1/2 amounts to g < 1, which means
that the externality is less important than the own commodity consumption
and leisure consumption combined. By choosing g and k1 close to one, one
obtains gˆ + kˆ1 close to one. A very small k2 yields a very small kˆ2. Hence, the
conditions are met if both the hardworking and the hedonistic trait are very
pronounced and the externality is almost as important as consumption of the
composite good and leisure combined.
Compared with an increase of α in Eq. 1, an increase of αˆ in Eq. 14 has
two additional effects: The leisure term gˆh1 ln(T − lh2) weighs more heavily
in the household’s objective function, whereas the leisure term gˆh2 ln(T − lh1)
has less weight. This is immediately reflected in the first member’s optimal
labor supply. Without the variable externality, the dependence on α assumes
the form −α(1 − k1) in Eq. 5. With the variable externality, the dependence
on αˆ takes the form −αˆ(1 − kˆ1 − gˆh1 − gˆh2) in Eq. 17. Under the assumptions
made to demonstrate the claim, the latter equals approximately αˆ/2. Hence, if
workaholism is very pronounced and the externalities are strong, but not too
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strong, then an increase of αˆ has a strong positive effect on the first household
member’s labor supply.5
Notice that for gˆh1 < 1/2, gˆ
h
2 < 1/2 and sufficiently small kˆ2, 1 − gˆh1 − gˆh2 −
kˆ2 > 0 holds. If so, the second members’ labor supply goes up, while their
composite good consumption goes down in response to an increase of αˆ.
Thus, there exist model parameter values such that a global shift of power or
priorities within households makes everyone in population I worse off.
With respect to a local change in relative bargaining power, say in household
h, an increase of αˆ from αˆ∗ to αˆ∗ harms all members of population I not
belonging to household h. If again 1 − gˆh1 − gˆh2 − kˆ2 > 0, then the second
member of household h will be harmed as well. The change can be detrimental
to the first household member’s welfare, too. The easiest way to arrive at this
conclusion is to consider ceteris paribus an increase in n. The labor supply
effect for the individual is independent of n. But the wage effect and, hence,
the effect on this individual’s composite good consumption become arbitrarily
small as n goes to infinity. Hence, for sufficiently large n, the net effect of a
given change from αˆ∗ to αˆ∗ on the first household member’s utility is negative.
Therefore, there are model parameter values such that a local shift of power
or priorities within a household makes everyone in population I worse off.
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